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All mobile phones use internal flash memory to store information. The flash memory 
contains personal user data that can be extracted with the use of forensics tools. This 
information could be used to profile a user’s daily activity. However, all smartphones 
provide a tool to erase (factory reset) the information from the flash memory. Twenty-one 
smartphones were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the factory-reset feature. A set of 
forensics tools from Cellebrite was used for the extraction and analysis process. The 
factory-reset feature was found to leave significant amounts of user-generated content 
after operation. The amount of user-generated content varied by vendor and model 
number. Extracted data are presented as evidence to show the ineffectiveness of the reset. 
User data such as photographs, audio files, text files, login information and geolocation 
data were left on the phone. The data analysis uncovered the unreliable nature of a 
factory reset and how the user is not properly protected. 
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A. MOBILE DEVICES, APPLICATIONS, AND USER DATA 
There has been significant growth in personal smartphone devices. In June 2013, 
the Google Android smartphone held 51.8% of the market, the highest share in the U.S. 
Table 1 [1]. Apple iOS maintained the second largest share at 40.6%, followed by 
BlackBerry at 3.4% and Microsoft at 3.1% [1]. Symbian still holds a 0.2% market share 
but has been discontinued by Nokia. The last Symbian smartphone was shipped in mid-
2012, according to the company’s 2012 Interim Report [2]. 
Top Smartphone Platforms 
3 Month Avg. Ending Dec. 2013 vs. 3 Month Avg. Ending Sep. 2013 
Total U.S. Smartphone Subscribers Age 13+ 
Source: comScore MobiLens 
  Share (%) of Smartphone Subscribers 
Sep-13 Dec-13 Point Change 
Android 51.8% 51.5% -0.3 
Apple 40.6% 41.8% 1.2 
BlackBerry 3.8% 3.4% -0.4 
Microsoft 3.3% 3.1% -0.2 
Symbian 0.3% 0.2% -0.1 
Total Smartphone Subscribers 100.0% 100.0%  
Table 1.   Top Smartphone Platforms (from [1]).  
Mobile phones use flash-memory [3] to store the base mobile operating system 
(OS), applications (apps), and user data. First-party applications are software created by 
the operating-system provider. For example, the Android smartphone includes a 
phonebook, a calendar and text-messaging applications created by Google’s own 
software-development team. Third-party applications are created by developers other 
than the provider of the mobile operating system.  
The internal flash memory of a mobile device contains several types of user-
generated information such as phone numbers, addresses, Short Message Service (SMS) 
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text messages, and cell data. These data can be extracted with the use of digital forensics 
tools and used to profile a user’s activity. Digital forensics is a branch of forensic science 
that investigates digital information stored in various electronic media. It can help 
investigate cybercrime, computer-based terrorism, and computer hacking involving 
digital environments. 
All smartphones provide a way to erase (reset) personal information from flash 
memory. The main focus of this thesis will be to evaluate the effectiveness of “factory 
data reset” feature on smartphones. A detailed and comprehensive survey can benefit not 
only the forensic community, but also anyone who uses a smartphone. The end result will 
help illustrate the limits of privacy protection offered by factory-reset features. It can also 
contribute to improved smartphone security and privacy policies if venders use this 
research to improve their products. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer one primary question:  
 How much user-generated data is left on a smartphone after using the 
mobile phone’s factory reset/wipe function? 
Two secondary questions also need to be addressed: 
 How much private/personal information can be extracted after the wipe? 
 Can recovered data be used to identify or profile a user? 
C. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II will discuss prior 
work in mobile forensics and similar research work done under this topic. Chapter III will 
cover the process of forensics research all hardware, software and computer 
environments used in these experiments. Chapter IV will cover experiments with some 
sample memory images. Chapter V will end with conclusions and propose future research 
work.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. GROWTH OF SMARTPHONES AND MOBILE COMPUTERING 
Mobile phones have become a significant consumer product in recent years. A 
telephone survey by Google Inc. of 2,000 adults in five countries [4] found that 
consumers own mobile phones more than any other mobile devices As Table 3 depicts, 
the survey found that Japan has highest adoption rate of mobile phones (96%), followed 





France Germany Japan 
Feature phone/Smartphone 78% 87% 74% 76% 96% 
Media player with web access 24% 17% 23% 12% 30% 
Tablet PC  Slate/Pad 9% 4% 3% 3% 5% 
Handheld gaming device 15% 17% 14% 7% 42% 
eReader 9% 3% 1% 1% 2% 
Table 2.   Mobile Internet & Smartphone Adoption: October 2011 (from [4]). 
A smartphone contains much of the functionality of a desktop PC, but it also 
includes radio communications capabilities that desktop PCs typically lack. 
Communication functionalities include GSM/CDMA radio, Near Field Communications, 
GPS, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth communication. The high mobility of these devices can be the 
most important factor in the shift from desktop/laptop computer to smartphones. Unlike 
laptops or desktop computers, a smartphone can easily fit in a pocket. It is a computer 
that is easy to use and small enough to be used almost anywhere. A user can browse the 
Internet, check email, use GPS navigation, and make online payments from personal 
bank accounts. Hence, a device this capable is also likely to contain personal user data. 
There are various ways a user can protect his or her personal information on 
smartphones. Android and iOS phones can be set up require a login password. Some 
phones include a data encryption method to protect sensitive data. Also, third-party 
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developers’ market mobile protection/encryption software [5] can be installed on both 
Android and iOS phones. The iPhone has hardware encryption enabled by default for all 
data stored in memory. There is also a Data Protection API provided by Apple that can be 
used to implement application-level encryption.  
In addition, common smartphones on the market today include some kind of 
“factory reset” feature. A factory reset is similar to formatting a hard disk drive on a 
computer system, but the details differ. Formatting deletes all pre-existing partitions and 
data on the hard drive and creates a new file system. The factory reset is intended to 
remove everything except pre-installed software, deleting user data in particular. 
The following is a list of data that should be erased by the factory reset [6], [7].  
 User account information (including email address) 
 User settings for the operating system and applications 
 Downloaded third-party applications 
 Downloaded music (.mp3s, .flac, and .aac) 
 Downloaded images and photos taken by the camera (.jpg, .png) 
 Other user data (address book/phone book/calendar data) 
The data that should be left behind after a factory reset is: 
 The operating system installed with the smartphone  
 First-party software (the operating system and associated software of the 
main vendor) and software (by other vendors authorized by the main 
vendor) bundled with the operating system 
 SD card files, as contrasted with files on the main flash memory on the 
phone 
B. PRIOR WORK 
Very little academic research has been conducted regarding the correctness of the 
factory reset feature on smartphones. However, there have been numerous articles on 
technology websites discussing potential risks [8], [9], [10].  The following are examples 
of the kinds of data left behind after a factor reset, from the GottaBeMobile: Mobile News 
& Reviews website:  
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 Porn  
 Court records  
 Social Security Numbers  
 Resumes  
 College applications  
 Cookies  
 Child support documents  
 Employee records  
 Bank statements  
 Credit card statements  
 Tax returns  
 Emails  
 Contact lists  
 Photos 
The authors tested secondhand phones purchased through Craigslist, which they 
then reset using the factory feature. The article concluded that the factory-reset feature 
did not work as expected. 
Another publication studied the effectiveness of the factory reset for network data 
structures left on an Android device [11]. The primary question was “Do sufficient 
residual artifacts exist on mobile devices to extract enough data to identify the device’s 
previous network access points?” The research used controlled data transfers between 
Android smartphones and multiple network access points (cellular, wireless, and 
Bluetooth). Residual data left on test devices included “userdata” partitions containing 
Service Set Identifiers (SSID), wireless-router Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM), DHCP 
ACKs from wireless routers, and base-station metadata that included the Mobile Network 
Code (MNC), Mobile Country Code (MCC), Local Area Code (LAC) and Cell 
Identification (CID), wireless router Media Access control (MAC) addresses, and 
Bluetooth MAC address of devices paired with the phone. It concluded that the factory-
reset feature was not sufficient in deleting user-generated network data. 
This thesis expands the research scope by analyzing all user-generated content. It 
analyzes all types of residual artifacts left behind after a factory reset.   
 6 
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III. DIGITAL FORENSICS TOOLS 
A. COMPUTER FORENSICS 
Computer forensic investigations follow a similar process to other forensic 
investigations [12]. The process involves acquisition, analysis and reporting of potential 
evidence involving criminal activity.  The evidence can be collected from any type of 
storage media. Examples of storage media are: 
 A hard disk drive from computer system 
 A CD/DVD/Blu-ray optical disk 
 A MO magnetic disk 
 A CF/SM/MMC memory card 
 A mobile SIM card 
 A USB flash memory 
Forensic tools can be used to acquire data from storage media by physical or 
logical acquisition. Physical acquisition is a bit-by-bit copy of an entire physical store of 
data. Logical acquisition is a bit-by-bit copy of the logical storage object such as 
directories and files.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology provides guidelines for 
forensic data acquisition and specifications for forensic tools [13]. NIST’s Computer 
Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) program establishes the methodology for testing 
computer forensic software. CFTT is part of the Software Diagnostics and Conformance 
Testing Division which is supported by The Office of Law Enforcement Standards. The 
project provides a means to help understand the capability, limitations, and validity of 
computer forensics tools. The tools to be tested are broken up into several categories: 
disk imaging, forensic media preparation; write-blocking software, write-blocking 
hardware, and mobile devices.  
Disk imaging is the process of making a secure forensically sound copy of digital 
media that can retain the data for an extended period. “Disk Imaging takes sector-by-
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sector copy usually for forensic purposes and as such it will contain some mechanism to 
prove that the copy is exact and has not been altered.” [14].  
Forensic media preparation is the practice of wiping the target media before 
storing forensics data onto the forensics examiner’s computer. A hard disk drive is 
usually used as a target media to store collected data. A wiping process prevents collected 
data on the target media from being “contaminated” by previously collected evidential 
data. A wipe should completely delete the existing data by overwriting all writable parts 
of the media. The Unix “dd” command is a common utility used to wipe storage media 
[15], and it can also be used to wipe data from internal flash memory in mobile phones.   
Write blockers are write-protection utilities used in the acquisition of digital forensic data. 
These utilities enable examiners to create images of media devices without the risk of 
accidentally writing to the subject media and thereby altering the contents [16].  
Several forensic techniques have been developed to help investigations such as 
string search, memory forensics, file extraction, feature extraction, and cross-drive 
analysis [17], [18], [19], [20]. These techniques increase the utility of captured data in 
forensics analysis. Memory forensics analyzes information stored on volatile memory, 
internal memory inside a computer or mobile device that requires power to maintain. The 
data stored in the memory changes frequently while the computer or mobile device is 
operational, which makes it hard to verify the data collected from memory. This can lead 
to problems if the examiner wants to run the acquisition process more than once [21].   
String searching is a process of locating specific ASCII or Unicode strings from 
text files and directories. These strings can be names, phone numbers, email addresses, 
country codes, IP addresses, or software installed on a system. The examiner can look for 
any type of key terms or single words, but it can also help spot patterns in a system. 
Regular expressions can be used to describe patterns in a string. An example regular 
expression is “/^[a-z0-9_-]/ “ which will look for any string that begins (^) with a lower 
case letter (a-z) followed by any number (0-9) then an underscore and a hyphen.  
 
 9 
B. MOBILE FORENSICS 
Mobile forensics has its own set of acquisition tools [22], [23], [24]. Imaging, 
forensic extraction, memory forensics, and string searching can all be applied to mobile 
forensics investigations. However, there are some differences. Hard disk drives can easily 
be removed from a computer system for data acquisition and analysis, and during this 
process the hard disk drives can be protected using a write blocker utility. A mobile 
device cannot be processed the same way because the internal flash memory is usually 
soldered onto the circuit board, and removing the flash memory may damage it. Most 
mobile forensics tools do not require for the flash memory to be removed, but connect the 
phone directly into a forensics hardware tool, or plug the phone into a computer system 
running the forensics software [25]. The mobile phone architecture is also different from 
a standard desktop computer. The mobile hardware supports various radio 
communications like GSM/CDMA, GPS, Wi-Fi, NFC and Bluetooth. This radio 
communication capability will generate additional user data on the smartphone. The 
GSM/CDMA and GPS radios store geolocation data. Wi-Fi, NFC and Bluetooth may 
store user account login information and passwords. User data are locally stored on the 
smartphone’s flash memory.   
C. MOBILE FORENSIC TOOL CELLEBRITE UFED 
A commercial forensics tool from Cellebrite was used for the data extraction 
process in our experiments. The Cellebrite UME-36 Pro is a standalone phone-memory 
transfer and backup solution that is capable of extracting data from a wide variety of 
mobile devices [26]. There are three key components for this forensics tool:  
 Cellebrite UME-36 Pro  – Universal Memory Exchanger 1.2.2.3 
 Cellebrite UFED Physical Analyzer 3.7.2.0 
 Cellebrite Phone Detective 1.2 
The UME-36 Pro enables logical, password, SIM, file-system, and physical 
extractions of data from mobile devices. It is a hardware solution for data extraction. The 
extracted data can be viewed and analyzed with the UFED Physical Analyzer software. 
UME-36 Pro claims to extract the following data from a smartphone [27]: 
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 Call logs 
 Contacts 
 Email 
 Pattern locks 
 Bookmarks 
 Cookies 
 Text strings from Short Message Service (SMS) / Multimedia Messaging 
Service (MMS)  
 Chat messages 
 Location data including cell tower locations and usage 
 Web browser history including records of visited websites  
 Digital photography, digital videos, and audio files 
 Text files 
 Deleted data 
 Wi-Fi including connection times, base service set identifications (BSSId), 
service set identifiers (SSID), and Security Modes 
 GPS information added to media files (geotags) 
The UFED Physical Analyzer is software for physical extraction. This extraction 
creates a single binary extraction file for each embedded flash memory chip, or at least by 
the address range used by the mobile device.  Unlike logical extraction, physical 
extraction can bypass the device’s operating system and extract data directly from the 
mobile device’s internal flash memory. The UFED-extracted data from the device is 
saved into a hexadecimal file that is later read and decoded using the UFED Physical 
Analyzer application. The images created from the physical extraction process include 
files deleted by the operating system or user. The images are saved with an .ufd extension. 
It provides an overview of the mobile-device data with decoding, analysis, and report 
generation [28]. 
The Cellebrite Phone Detective application helps investigators identify a mobile 
phone by its physical attributes, eliminating the need to start the device and risk device 
lock or possible data loss. It asks eight key questions regarding the phones’ physical 
appearance. It provides the user with a detailed extraction capability per device, 
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connectivity details and device characteristics [29]. The eight visual elements used to 
identify device are: 
 Phone type (candy bar, clamshell, slider, tablet) 
 Body (connection port, cable, charging socket) 
 Power button (power, volume, camera, keypad) 
 Miscellaneous (battery cover type, memory card slot) 
 Basic (Brand logo: Apple, HTC, Acer, LG / network technology: GSM, 
CDMA) 
 Camera (type, location, flash) 
 Display type (touch, non-touch, stylus) 
D. MOBILE FORENSIC TOOL BULK EXTRACTOR 
The forensics software Bulk Extractor (bulk_extractor-1.4.1-windowsinstaller.exe) 
[30] was also used for analysis of recovered files. Bulk Extractor is a carving and feature 
extraction tool that can be used on all kinds of digital media. It can scan disk images (raw, 
split-raw, EnCase E01, AFF), files and directories to extract useful information without 
parsing the file system or file system structures. The program can extract phone numbers, 
email addresses, credit card numbers and URLs from inspection of file contents of any 
file or file fragments. It can also collect data from compressed files with ZIP and gzip 
algorithms. The extractor is run on a file system and creates a report directory with 
feature files. Each feature file contains the location the feature found, the feature itself, 
and the feature surrounded by its local context (e.g., email.txt, url.txt). The tool is 
generally used for file identification and cross-drive analysis [31].  
E. OTHER MOBILE FORENSICS TOOLS TESTED 
Several other forensics tools were tested for this research project before we 
selected Cellebrite. Some that offer similar features to the Cellebrite UFED tools were as 
follows. 
viaExtract: This is a mobile forensics tool developed and distributed by 
viaForensics [32]. It is designed for extracting and analyzing data from Android 
smartphones. It is distributed as a standalone virtual appliance that runs on a VMware 
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workstation. The pre-installed extraction tools could not properly analyze several 
Android phones. It would often return an error during the extraction process on our test 
phones.  
Key features:  
 Temporarily or permanently remove a password/pattern/PIN lock on an 
Android device running OS 2.2 or higher. 
 Allow the examiner to forensically image external (SD) and internal 
(EMMC) storage cards directly from the device. 
 Allow examiners an additional bypass option on gesture key locked 
devices. 
Oxygen Forensic Suite 2013: This forensics suite is developed and distributed by 
Oxygen Software [33]. The company specializes in forensic data examination tools for 
smartphones and mobile devices. The program performed fairly well and could recovery 
a large number of files (images, video, system files, logs). 
Key features: 
 Displays complete technical information about the mobile device. 
 Extracts user contact information with all its data: name, occupation, 
phone numbers, addresses, emails, notes. 
 Extracts event log data, phonebook, messages (SMS, MMS, Emails, 
iMessages).  
 File browser analyzes user phones, videos, documents and device 
databases. 
Recuva: This is a free program developed and distributed by Priform [34]. It is a 
disk recovery tool that is capable of extracting files deleted or damaged on media devices. 
The program can recover a large number of files from the internal flash memory of a 
smartphone. However, the program does not provide an analysis tool for the recovered 
data. This makes the file analysis very difficult. Several files could not be opened or 
viewed with the program.  
Key features:  
 Undelete files. 
 Recover damaged or formatted disks. 
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 Recover deleted emails. 
 Recover deleted iPod music. 
 Restore unsaved documents. 
 Perform deep scan. 
  
 14 
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IV. EXPERIMENTS 
A. CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT WITH TWO SMARTPHONES 
Two smartphones were used for a controlled experiment: an Apple iPhone 4S and 
a Samsung Galaxy SIII. The following protocol was used to artificially generate data 
under a controlled environment. 
 Log into the Android phone with the account forensic.nps@gmail.com, 
and the iPhone with the account rschwamm@nps.edu.  






 Take six pictures with built in camera: 6 pictures of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 
















 Install the following list of software for Android phones: 
 
“Reddit is fun”  
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.andrewshu.android.red
dit&hl=en 
Visit 3 postings on www.reddit.com 
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o “ELI5: The Amanda Knox Appeal” 
http://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/1wlin9/eli5_the_
amanda_knox_appeal/ 
o “Why are the wheels of NASA’s Mars rover, Curiosity, wearing out?” 
http://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/1wnb8s/why_are_the_
wheels_of_nasas_mars_rover_curiosity/ 







Login and browse. 
 
“Google Drive”  
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.apps.do
cs&hl=en 
















Login and watch 3 videos 
o ‘PSY-GANGNAM STYLE’ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bZkp7q19f0 
o ‘GIFs, now with sound!’ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CgVpR4KdLRA 







Login and download/listen to 3 excerpts 
o Bossypants (Excerpt) 
o The Hunger Games (Excerpt) 








 Upload a text document ‘testschwamm_password.txt’ to root directory of 
each phone. 
 Upload zip file containing above text named ‘testschwamm_userdata.zip’ 
to root directory of each phone 
 Use the following list of pre-installed software on iPhone: 
 
“Youtube” 
Login and watch 3 videos 
o ‘PSY-GANGNAM STYLE’ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bZkp7q19f0 
o ‘GIFs, now with sound!’ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CgVpR4KdLRA 
o ‘BEST DUBSTEP CAT!’ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4SSoWEw5CI 
 
  “Notes” 
Create 3 note entries 
o DVD Movie List 
o Shopping List 
o Test date and homework due date 
 
  “Remind Me” 
 Create 3 reminders different dates 
o ‘Reminder 1’ ‘02/01/2014 5:00PM’ 
o ‘Reminder 2’ ‘03/03/20145 7:00AM’ 
o ‘Reminder 3’ ‘04/05/2014 11:00AM’  
The phones were not password protected by the user and no data intentionally 
encoded or encrypted by the phone. Following use, a factory reset was performed through 
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the phone’s setup menu under “Privacy” or “Backup & Reset”. The reset menu lists all 
data that will be erased in the process (User account, system and application data and 
settings, downloaded applications, music, pictures and other user data). The user did not 
have any selectable options for the reset on any of the phones. The process takes a few 
minutes after which the phone restarts and resumes normal operation.  
Following factory reset, the phones were images with the UME-36 Pro and UFED 
Physical Analyzer. All images were saved in the tools proprietary format (.ufd). 
A total of 61,276 files were recovered from the pre-wipe for the iPhone and 
43,165 from the post-wipe. 42,728 files matched path and contents from both pre-wipe 
and post-wipe. Partial matches were deleted which produced 17,914 pre-reset files and 
115 post-reset files that did not match. 36,292 files had a zero size from the pre-wipe and 
36,319 files had zero size from the post-wipe. Executable “.app” files found pre-wipe 
were 24,862, and 8,062 post-wipe. Files relating to the operating system were 29,812 pre-
wipe and 27,621 post-wipe.   
Overall, the reset did a good job of removing third-party software. All the picture 
images and text documents were deleted by the reset with the exception of some cache 
and settings information (YouTube, Facebook).  
The Bulk Extractor was used for string search. A number of preference and 
configuration files were recovered after the reset but none containing the keywords. 
“Preferences” can include private user information [35], but none were seen in the “.plist” 
preference files.  Table 3 lists some sample files remaining after the reset that could be 
interesting for forensic investigations. The indirect information can be collected and used 


















Data/Data/mobile/Library /BulletinBoard/SectionInfo.plist Bulletin board index 
Data/Data/mobile/Library /Caches/com.apple.springboard 
/Cache.db-wal 




Cookies for iTunes 
Data/Data/mobile/Library/Mail /Content Index Mail keywords 




Data/Data/mobile/Media /PhotoData/changes-shm Incremental photo data 
Data/Data/root/Library/Caches /locationd/consolidated.db Location data 
Data/Data/tmp/MediaCache /diskcacherepository.plist Disk cache information 
Table 3.   Sample files from post-wipe iPhone 
A total of 5,141 files were recovered from the pre-wipe for the Android phone 
and 3,578 from the post-wipe. 3,292 files matched path and content from both pre-wipe 
and post-wipe. Partial matches were deleted which produced 968 pre-wipe and 65 post-
wipe that did not match. 227 files had a zero size from the pre-wipe and 278 files had 
zero size form the post-wipe. Executable “.apk” files found pre-wipe were 396, and 277 
post-wipe. Other executable files such as “.dex” files went from 140 pre-wipe to 121 
post-wipe. “.so” files from 302 to 254. The reset did not delete any picture images taken 
with the camera. None of the created text files (.txt, .doc, .pdf, .ppt) was removed. Cache 
and deleted copies of these file and image components were also not erased. Third-party 
applications were deleted. However, following the wipe we could recover files from the 
Kindle and DropBox applications that belonged to the user. These files should have been 
deleted along with the application. The fact that files from deleted applications were 
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found post-wipe implies that the wipe process explicitly deleted files, a topic that we will 
return to in Chapter V. 
The Bulk Extractor was used again for additional string search. Website links 
were all deleted in the reset. However, the links for the four visited websites were found 
in various files pre-wipe. A total of 116 links were found pre-wipe. It is unclear why 
there were so many duplicate links saved on the phone. The wipe left most of the 
operation system files intact just like the iPhone reset. Table 4 lists some sample files 
remaining after the reset that could be interesting for forensic investigations. 
File Description 
CACHE/Root/recovery /last_log Recovery log 
SYSTEM/Root /addon.d /blacklist Four MD5 hash values 
SYSTEM/Root/etc/apns-conf.xml Phone carrier IP address 
SYSTEM/Root/etc /audio_policy.conf Attached audio devices 
listing 














Image cache data 
USERDATA/Root/media/0/iPhone3G.2013-11-07.16-39-
30/Email/108/478/1256.sql 
Database script of ours, 
unclear how it got here 
USERDATA/Root/misc /wifi/softap.conf Access point data 
USERDATA/Root/system/users/userlist.xml User ID information 
USERDATA/Root/drm /fwdlock/kek.dat Lock data 
USERDATA/Root/media/0/And-roid/data/com.dropbox.android 
/files/scratch/09thesis_regan.pdf 
Document of previous 
phone user 
Table 4.   Sample files from post-wipe Android phone 
Some smartphones provide several variations for reset. A “hard reset” can be 
performed by using the hardware keys (by a procedure specific to each device). Newer 
iPhones provide the additional reset options “Reset All Settings,” “Reset Network 
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Settings,” “Reset Keyboard and Dictionary,” “Reset Home Screen Layout,, and “Reset 
Location and Memory”.  All of these options were used and a new post-wipe image was 
generated. These options deleted an additional 222 files from the phone but did not delete 
any files listed in Table 3. The additional reset options did not produce any significant 
further deletions.  
The hard reset on the Android phone gave an additional option for a “cache reset”. 
This option was used and a new post-wipe image was generated just like the iPhone. It 
did not delete any text and media files put on the device; it only deleted the sixth file of 
the files in Table 4. Four files with the “db” extension were deleted. The reset added an 
additional six files (two Bluetooth cache, four “telephony”), but did not do much beyond 
the regular reset. 
B. EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXTRACTION 
Two sets of smartphones were used for the main experiment. The first set of 
Apple iPhone images was created by the UME-36 Pro and UFED Physical Analyzer. 
These images were taken from the Real Data Corpus [36], a large-scale forensic corpus. 
All images were generated from legally obtained smartphones used by real people. The 
second set was of various smartphones (iPhone, Android, Blackberry) that had been used 
for other research projects at our school. These phones did not have a SIM card installed 
on them. SIM cards contain a unique identification number associated with the user’s 
mobile account and contain the phone number, security data and billing information; 
phone calls cannot be made without a SIM card, but otherwise the phone will function 
normally. A few of the phones came with a custom Android operating system 
(CyanogenMod 10.1), a custom aftermarket firmware based on the Android Open Source 
Project [37] [38]. The same protocol was used to generate data but no accounts were 
associated with the Blackberry phones. A Python script was written to convert the 
Cellebrite proprietary XML report format to the forensic metadata standard DFXML [39]. 
A taxonomy created [40] was used to classify files by extension and directory path. The 
full list of smartphones and the status is listed in Table 5. 
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# Smartphone OS Version Readiness 
I1 Apple iPhone 4 iOS 5.1.1 OK 
I2 Apple iPhone 4 iOS 5.1.1 OK 
I3 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.1.3 OK 
I4 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.1.3 OK 
I5 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.1.3 OK 
I6 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.1.3 OK 
I7 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.1.3 OK 
I8 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.0 OK 
I9 Samsung Galaxy SIII CyanogenMod 10.1 Hard reset 
A10 Samsung Nexus CyanogenMod 10.1 OK 
A11 Samsung Galaxy Anycall Android 1.5 OK 
A12 Motorola Atrix 4G Android 2.2 OK 
A13 HTC Droid Eris Android 2.1 OK 
A14 HTC Magic Android 1.6 Hard reset 
A15 HTC Flyer (tablet) Android 3.2 OK 
A16 HTC One Android 4.1 OK 
B17 BlackBerry 8900 Curve BlackBerry OS 4 Unusable after reset 
I18 Apple iPhone 4S iOS 5.1.1 OK 
I19 Apple iPhone 2G iOS 3.13 Unusable without SIM card 
B20 BlackBerry 8100 Pearl  BlackBerry OS 4.5.0.174 OK 
B21 BlackBerry 8300 Curve BlackBerry OS 4.5.0.162 OK 
A22 Motorola FIRE Android 2.3.4 Unrecognized by Cellebrite 
A23 Huawei U8500 Android 2.1 OK 
A24 Huawei  U8150 IDEOS Comet Android 2.2 Unusable after reset 
A25  Dell XCD35 Android 2.2 OK 
I26 Apple iPhone 2 iOS 3.1.3 Unusable after reset 
A27 Motorola Charm Android 2.1 Totally dead 
p28 LG-500GHL Unknown Unrecognized by Cellebrite 
Table 5.   Full list of smartphone and status (from [41], [42]). 
Table 6 list the total counts of pre-wipe and post-wipe files. A large number of 
files were not affected by the reset. There were four types of partial matches between pre-
wipe and post-wipe files (File name and hash, Hash only, File path only, Path ignoring 
digits). Several unmatched files were found post-wipe which appear to be new records 
created by the operating systems activity and reset feature. The factory reset does not 
completely wipe a device. Several files are removed during the reset but others are just 
renamed and additional new files are added after the reset. 
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File count type Pre-reset Post-reset 
Total files 349,915 200,987 
iPhone files 299,058 176,907 
Android files 50,846 24,058 
Exact matches pre-wipe and post-wipe 140,320 140,320 
Subsequent matches on filename and hash value but not 
all directories 
34,228 36,540 
Subsequent matches on hash value alone 9,269 12,911 
Subsequent matches on full path alone 2,849 2,836 
Subsequent matches on full path ignoring digits alone 6,448 256 
Remaining unmatched 156,801 8,124 
Table 6.   Summary data from 21 smartphones 
The file taxonomy was used to further investigate what types of files are being 
removed in the reset. The full results are listed in Table 7. Each file path is classified by 
file extension (E) and directory name of the file (D). 8,346 extensions and 6,445 directory 
names have a classification. The rest are labeled as “miscellaneous”. Extensions that are 
longer than 10 characters are ignored.  
The reset appears to focus on video and picture images, text documents, copies 
and temporary files, disk images, log files, XML documents and gaming applications. 
There is a smaller emphasis on database files, compressed data, audio, source code and 
data directories. The reset seem to target applications, picture images and temporary files, 
but not as focused on long-term user data. The reset does not remove explicitly deleted 
and zero-size files (which have no content but do have filename and dates). Zero-size 
files may not be useful for the applications, but could provide partial user information. 
An empty log file could indicate the user is not using a particular category or parameter 
in an application.    
A clear time pattern could not be created because the phones were used in various 
time periods. The Physical Analyzer software also created some issues while analyzing 
the recovered data. Different versions of the Physical Analyzer would produce different 
results from the same image. The file access and creation time would be reported 
differently depending on the Physical Analyzer version, and the root directory name 
would change between two different Physical Analyzer versions. 
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Type of file extension (E) or directory (D) Pre-wipe Post-wipe 
E: No extension 36561 21078 
E: Operating system 106168 104406 
E: Graphics 98618 27522 
E: Camera pictures 15443 3967 
E: Temporaries 733 159 
E: Web pages 1418 680 
E: Documents 3089 1233 
E: Database 5627 2377 
E: Spreadsheets 425 356 
E: Compressed 601 278 
E: Audio 16427 8313 
E: Video 303 90 
E: Source code 1791 736 
E: Executable 3432 2856 
E: Disk image 13828 1932 
E: Log 599 73 
E: Copies and backup 7347 905 
E: XML 5193 1045 
E: Configuration 20788 18379 
E: Games 3741 1048 
E: Miscellaneous 7307 3536 
D: Root 1012 966 
D: Operating system 122625 117701 
D: Hardware 1128 319 
D: Temporaries 12141 2928 
D: Pictures 17950 4328 
D: Audio 10812 7814 
D: Video 2570 0 
D: Web 2714 277 
D: Data 18300 9771 
D: Programs 3616 2876 
D: Documents 6211 1036 
D: Sharing 7500 2368 
D: Security 2953 2749 
D: Games 53722 0 
D: Applications 84593 46696 
D: Miscellaneous 2046 1126 
“.DELETED.” in path(*) 20087 4181 
Zero-size files 120112 128026 
Table 7.   File type counts before and after the factory reset. 
(*) Paths containing the word “.DELETED” were found on the phone.  
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The data collected from the Physical Analyzer are listed in Table 8 and 9. The 
Physical Analyzer categorizes each data type and groups.  
Phone Data: 
 Application Usage: Applications name, number of launches, activations, 
active time, and date 
 Call Log: Caller phone number, time stamp, duration, and type 
(incoming/outgoing/missed). 
 Contacts Cookies: Contacts name, organizations, phone number, emails, 
other entries, notes, and addresses. 
 Installed Applications: Application name, version, identifier, App ID, 
purchase date, and delete date. 
 IP Connections: Timestamp, domain, router address MAC address, 
Cellular WAN, Device IP, DNS address, and service name. 
 Locations: Timestamp, position, and name. 
 Maps: Source, zoom level, and tiles. 
 Passwords 
 SMS messages: Timestamp, folder (drafts, inbox, sent), phone number, 
text string, and status (unsent, sent, or read). 
 User Accounts: Name, user name, password, and service type. 
 User Dictionary: Word, locale, and bookmark note. 
 Wireless Networks: Last connected, BSSId, SSId, and Security Mode 
 
Data Files: 
 Picture Images (png, jpg), Audio (wav, mp3), Text (html, txt, xml), 
Databases (db, sqlite3, itdb), Configuration (plist), or Application (jar, 
apk, ipa). 





 I1               I2               I3                I4              I5                I6                  I7             I8 
Phone Type                 I                 I                 I                  I                 I                  I                    I               I 
Application Usage 0/0             0/0             1/199           0/0             1/125          1/56              9/23           0/23 
Call Log 0/0             0/2             0/103           0/0             0/107          0/104            0/13           0/105 
Contacts 0/0             0/0             0/209           0/0             0/1461        0/2366          0/0             0/284 
Cookies 0/0             0/0             0/5               0/0             0/0              0/43              0/0             0/6 
Installed 
Applications  
34/34         34/34         23/127         28/34         23/142        23/56            0/24           0/79 
IP Connections  0/2             0/2             0/2               0/1             0/0               0/1               0/0             0/7 
Locations 0/0             0/0             0/1               0/0             0/0               5/10             0/0             0/72 
Maps 0/0             0/0             0/12             0/0             0/0               0/2               0/0             0/19 
Passwords 0/6             0/5             0/0               0/1             0/0               0/0               0/0             0/0 
SMS Messages 0/0             0/2             0/30             0/0             0/1152         0/50             0/0             0/672 
User Accounts 0/0             1/1             1/1               1/1             1/1               1/6               1/1             1/3 
User Dictionary 0/0             0/1             0/161           0/0             0/30             0/312           0/0             0/819 
Wireless 
Networks 
0/0             1/1             0/1               0/0             0/0               0/0               0/0             0/0 
Images 3714/3716 3715/3716 2488/16541 2631/2716 2488/25106 5888/14477 2491/2611 2488/13705 
Audio 1/1             1/1             2/2512         1/1             2/1202         2/1125         2/2             2/1120 
Text 159/161     159/164     11/392         20/34         11/1689       12/67           12/21         12/135 
Databases 31/38         32/43         13/60           21/50         23/54           12/63           13/24          23/55 
Configurations 2797/2969 2831/2959 1349/4798   1976/2969 1352/6978   1345/2237   1348/1382 1349/10930 
Applications 6/6             6/10           164/489       227/304     164/458       164/200       164/310   164/670 
Table 8.   The number represents user data and system data on smartphones part 1.  




 A9         A10        A11   A12           A13   A14   A15   A16       I18         B20    B21   A25 
Phone Type                   A            A            A        A              A        A       A        A          I            B       B        A 
Application Usage 0/0         1/139     0/0     0/102         0/0     0/0     0/0     0/0         0/0         0/0      0/0    0/0 
Call Log 0/0         0/0         0/0     0/52           0/5     0/6     0/0     7/192     0/1        0/100  0/11 0/61 
Contacts 0/0         0/5         0/0     0/48           0/0     0/2     0/0     0/65       0/0        0/477  0/0   5/252 
Cookies 0/0         0/3         0/0     0/0             0/0     0/5     0/0     0/0         0/17        0/0    0/0   0/16 
Installed 
Applications  
30/30     48/102   25/43 23/32         26/70 20/24 12/44 0/0         34/34      0/0    0/0     0/1 
IP Connections  0/0         0/2         0/0     0/3             0/0     0/1     0/0     0/0         1/6          0/0    0/0   0/0 
Locations 0/0         0/0         0/5     0/0             0/10   0/0     0/0     0/0         0/0          0/0    0/0   0/9 
Maps 0/15       0/5         0/8     0/0             0/0     0/0     0/0     0/0         0/0          0/0    0/0   0/0 
Passwords 0/0         0/0         0/0     0/1             0/0     0/1     0/1     0/0         5/9          0/0    0/0   0/1 
SMS Messages 0/80       0/5         0/0     0/121         0/0     0/2     0/0     0/66       0/0          0/4    0/0   0/76 
User Accounts 1/1         1/1         0/0     0/0             0/1     0/1     0/0     0/1         1/1          0/0    0/0   0/2 
User Dictionary 0/132     0/50       0/0     0/84           0/40   0/1     0/0     0/0         0/6          0/0    0/0   0/2  
Wireless Networks 0/1         0/1         0/0     0/1             0/0     0/0     0/1     0/0         3/7          0/0    0/0   0/1 
Images 150/150 764/764 11/11 1815/1815 42/42 15/15 9/9  616/616 3716/3743 0/7    0/3 71/159 
Audio 1/1         1/1         1/1     1/1             0/0     2/2     2/2     82/82     1/1          0/1    0/0    1/1 
Text 130/130  48/48    0/0     132/132     1/1     0/0     4/4     1/1       243/263   0/0   0/0 440/3031 
Databases 5/65       12/45     0/0     25/41         0/0     10/24 0/0     16/36     37/58      0/0   0/0   24/55 
Configurations 0/0         0/0         0/0     0/0             0/0     0/0     0/0     0/0     2850/2953  0/0   0/0    0/0 
Applications 0/0        313/313  0/0     7/7             3/3     1/1     24/24 0/3          6/6         0/0  0/0  388/390 
Table 9.   The number represents user data and system data on smartphone part 2 
(post-wipe/pre-wipe) I=iPhone, A=Android, B=BlackBerry 
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C. ISSUES WITH THE SMARTPHONES 
The factory reset was performed without any problems on most of the 
smartphones. However, on the HTC Magic (A14) and Samsung Galaxy SIII (A9) the 
smartphones locked up after the reset. The HTC Magic was running a standard Android 
1.6 operating system and the Samsung Galaxy SIII was running a custom CyanogenMod 
10.1 operating system. A hard reset on the HTC Magic and a custom reset had to be 
performed on the Samsung Galaxy SIII running CyanogenMod 10.1 to recover normal 
operations. Holding down the volume up button and the power button at the same time 
performs a hard reset, but does not remove any applications or user data from the 
smartphone. After the hard reset the factory reset did not cause any further problems. The 
cause of the lockup could not be determined.  
The factory-reset on the BlackBerry 8900 Curve (B17), Huawei U8150 Comet 
(A24) and Apple iPhone 2 (I26) made the devices unusable after the restart. The device 
could not be properly restarted or became unstable. The Motorola Charm (A27) could not 
be charged or booted and appeared to be unusable. 
The HTC Eris (A13) could not be properly processed without a micro SD card 
and installed on the phone. The Apple iPhone 2G (I19) could not be used without a SIM 
card. Both the UME36-Pro and UFED Physical analyzer returned an error when there 
was no micro SD or SIM card in the phone. A compatible micro SD/SIM card was not 
available at the time of the experiment. These two phones were the only ones that 
produced this error. The cause of the error could not be determined.   
The Motorola FIRE (A22) and LG-500GHL (p28) was not recognized by 
Cellebrite. The Motorola FIRE is running the Android OS 2.3.4 and is officially 
supported by UFED Touch Ultimate. The LG-500GHL is a prepaid phone with a 
proprietary operating system by LG. None of the forensics tools tested was able to 
identify or extract data from these phones. This could be due to the proprietary operating 
system installed on the LG phone. 
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The HTC One returned the same results for most of the tools tested. There is an 
important difference between the HTC One and the other smartphones used in this 
project. When a smartphone is connected (via USB) to a computer system it is mounted 
as a USB mass storage device. The HTC One and several newer Android phones (4.0 and 
up) are connected using a different protocol developed by Microsoft called the Media 
Transfer Protocol (MTP) [43]. The computer sees the attached smartphone as a media 
player while connected with MTP. The different mounting protocols created conflict with 
the forensics tools used for this project. However, during this research project we were 
able to gain access to a newer Cellebrite hardware solution, the Cellebrite UFED Touch 
Ultimate [44], an updated version of the UME-36 Pro. It provides a touchscreen interface 
with Windows XP running as the base operating system. It provides the same 
functionality with a wider range of supported mobile devices. The UFED Touch Ultimate 
is capable of extracting data from MTP devices and was used for the HTC One (A16).   
D. DATA ANALYSIS WITH THE PHYSICAL ANALYZER 
A list of extracted data was created and viewed in the Physical Analyzer 
application. All phones listed in Table 8 and 9 were used (Android, IPhone, BlackBerry). 
Phone data (traditional telephone usage information) in both sets was almost completely 
removed after a factory reset, including:  
 Call log 
 Contacts 
 Cookies 




 User directory  
Application Usage data were limited to system applications and did not contain 
any user information. System applications are indicated by the identifier com.apple.XX 
for iOS and com.google.XX for Android. A list is generated by the Physical Analyzer. 
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Installed Applications data left on the phones were default first-party applications 
such as maps, YouTube, mobile mail, calculator, weather, preferences, and mobile notes. 
The same system application identifiers were used to verify first-party applications. There 
were no third-party applications left on the phones after a factory reset. However, the 
number of installed applications on post-wipe phones varied. The Physical Analyzer 
could not identify any user-installed applications on the I7 and I8 iPhones after the 
factory reset. The system applications and first-party applications are not supposed to be 
removed after a factory reset. The Physical Analyzer showed zero entries after the wipe. 
This means the UME-36 Pro could not properly identify the applications. The reasons are 
unknown as to why the UME-36 Pro failed to identify the installed applications.  
Location data were only left on the I6: Apple iPhone 2. The data contained 
latitude and longitude  (18.47717, 73.87550 – Pune, India) information for a cell tower 
and a time stamp (3/24/2011 7:44:24AM). This can be considering sensitive user 
information since it reveals the time, date, and location of where the user has been.  
User Accounts and Wireless Networks data was recovered from a number of 
phones but it did not contain any identifiable information. Entries were listed in the 
Physical Analyzer but it did not contain any data (user name, email, BSSId, SSId, 
password). It identified a previously existing account, but could not recover any 
additional user or network data. The account information could have been encrypted or 
encoded after the reset. 
JPEG and PNG image files were not removed from any of the Android phones by 
the factory reset. All picture images (downloaded, camera, and browser thumbnails) are 
supposed to be removed after a reset. All picture images were left on those phones 
untouched and were still viewable within the smartphone. The 6 images added before the 
reset was also left untouched and viewable in the smartphone. The iPhones did a better 
job at wiping the images and none of the image files including thumbnails were viewable 
after the factory reset. However, the metadata (name, file path, size, created, modified, 
accessed) for the images were still viewable in the Physical Analyzer.  
Audio data was not removed from any of the Android set, including .wav audio 
files from applications and user-downloaded files (.mp3). The iPhone set deleted most of 
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the audio files, but some .wav files were still recoverable. The files recovered from the 
iPhones included system audio files (e.g. ring tones) and notification sound clips that had 
been installed by third-party software. All recovered audio files could be played back on 
a media player.  
Text data were not removed from any of the Android set. The file types that were 
recognized as data were files with .txt and .xml extensions.  The iPhones did delete some 
text files, but the same types of files were recovered.  Recovered .xml files contained 
readable string data such as domain names and IP addresses associated with user 
activities. Text files contained various notes or memos created by the user. 
Database data (.db, sqlite, .sql) recovered from both sets contained no data. The 
results were similar to the user accounts data and wireless network data. The metadata 
(name, file path, size, creation time, modification time, and access time) was viewable 
after the factory reset but no data was stored in the files.   
Configuration data recovered from the iPhones only contained system-file access 
data. The access information appears to be the same data as the Applications files. Data 
was not recoverable from any of the Android set, but this could be due to the fact that the 
same information is already in the Applications files. The recovered data did not contain 
any user information. 
Applications data only contained information from first-party software installed 
on the phone. The data contained various framework, library, and plug-in information for 
system software. No user data was stored in the applications files. The application data on 
the A16 Android phone contained user account information before the wipe. The 
Physical Analyzer labeled it as installed applications. This was the only data that was 
mislabeled. The data was cleared after a reset and did not contain any user account 
information. It is unclear why the Physical Analyzer mislabeled this information.   
Each file that contained user-generated data was counted and summarized in 




 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 
Data Files: 
Images 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Audio 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Text 1 2 5 7 1 1 1 1 
Databases 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Configurations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Applications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 10.   User data files found in the smartphones part 1  
 
 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 I18 A20 B21 A25 
Data Files:      
Images 5 61 10 1698 42 15 5 616 0 0 0 6 
Audio 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 15 0 0 0 0 
Text 1 4 1 7 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 
Databases 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Configurations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Applications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 11.   User data files found in the smartphones part 2 
E. STRING SEARCHING WITH LINUX GREP COMMAND 
 String searching was used for additional analysis of recovered files. 
During the analysis process with the Physical Analyzer, we searched for 
some keywords of interest in data files: 
 password 





 SSL  
The standard Linux grep [45] command was used to search for the keywords. 
 
 33 
The A10 Android phone was the only one that returned a value with the 
“password” keyword, and this should have been deleted by the factory reset. This is one 
of the phones with a custom CyanogenMod 10.1 installed. An .xml file under the 
Cyanogen system directory contained several entries with website URLs and user names 
with passwords stored in clear text that should have been deleted. The other phones did 
not contain any password information. All phones returned at least one file that contained 
the “root certificate” phrase. The files contained characters varying in length between 
115-144. It is unclear if this is the default trusted certificate installed with the operating 
system or if it is part of third-party software that used certificates. In the latter case the 
data should have been deleted. The information included in the files could not be 
identified as user data. Searches for the strings “hash”, “cert”, “SHA1”, “MD5”, and 
“SSL” did not return any significant results. These keywords only occurred in 
configuration files, which did not contain any user data.  
Searching for the “hash” keyword did not return anything significant, but 
searching for “HASH” returned some interesting results. The “HASH” keyword still 
occurred in configuration files for iPhones but the files were always associated with an 
application called Rocky Racoon on the iPhones I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, and I8. This application 
is used exclusively with jailbroken iPhones [46]. Jailbreaking is the process of using a 
hardware or software exploit to break the restrictions on the iPhones file system [47]. A 
jailbroken iPhone grants the user root access to the iOS operating system. Once the 
iPhone is jailbroken it can be freely modified. The user can install unauthorized third-
party applications, plugins and themes on the iPhone. It also allows the user to switch 
mobile carriers without any restrictions. Jailbreaking a phone also exposes the user to 
various security risks. Unauthorized software runs the risk of damaging or disabling the 
iPhone. This may have affected the data on the iPhones. It is not clear if these iPhones 
have been jailbroken. However, there is a high chance they were since the Rocky Racoon 
software is only used with jailbroken iPhones.  
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F. DATA ANALYSIS WITH BULK EXTRACTOR 
The Bulk Extractor tool (Ver. 1.4.1: Windows installer with GUI) was used to 
verify some of the user data generated from the experiment procedures. The smartphone 
images created from the physical extraction process (.ufd) were not compatible with Bulk 
Extractor and needed to be converted. A full dump of the file system was created from 
the .ufd images using the Physical Analyzer. Each .ufd image generated a directory of 
files, which was run on the Bulk Extractor.  
The ‘url_histogram.txt’ generated by the extractor showed that all website 
(youtube.com, facebook.com, reddit.com, faculty.nps.edu) links were deleted in the reset. 
Duplicate links for the four visited websites (nps.edu, fark.com, yahoo.com, npr.org) 
were found in various files on pre-wipe iPhones. It is unclear why there were duplicate 
links saved on iPhones. None of the other phones contained multiple copies of the same 
links.  
Preference and configuration files (.plist) were recovered from most of the phones 
except for the BlackBerry phones (B20, B21) after the reset. None of the files contained 
user information. Setting information was checked in the ‘json.txt’ file generated by the 
extractor.  
The zip file uploaded to the root directory ‘testschwamm_userdata.zip’ was not 
deleted from any of the Android phones and the text file ‘testschwamm_password.txt’ 
can be viewed in the ‘zip.txt’ generated by the extractor.  
During the keyword search several files containing the word ‘DELETED’ 
appeared in the ‘Feature File’ results window. The Bulk Extractor displayed some text 
files (.txt) that included the word ‘DELETED’ as part of the file name. None of these 
files contained any readable data and were all located at the top-level directory. The 
Physical Analyzer could not find any of these tagged files. It became clear that further 
investigation was needed to determine if any more user-generated data were not properly 
identified by the Physical Analyzer. The following common file extensions [48] were 
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used for a string search against the full file system dump. The same grep command was 
used to search for these common file extensions. 
 Text files (doc, docx, log, msg, odt, pages, rtf, tex, txt, wpd, wps) 
 Data files  (csv, dat, gbr, ged, ibooks, key, keychain, pps, ppt, pptx, sdf, 
tar,  
 tax2012, vcf, xml) 
 Audio files (aif, iff, m3u, m4a, mid, mp3, mpa, ra, wav, wma) 
 Video files (3g2, 3gp, asf, asx, avi, flv, m4v, mov, mp4, mpg, rm, srt, swf, 
vob 
 , wmv) 
 3D image files (3dm, 3ds, max, obj) 
 Raster image files (bmp, dds, gif, jpg, png, psd, pspimage, tga, thm, tif, 
tiff, yuv) 
 Vector image files (ai, eps, ps, svg) 
 Page layout files (indd, pct, pdf) 
 Spreadsheet files (xlr, xls, xlsx) 
 Database files (accdb, db, dbf, mdb, pdb, sql) 
 Executable files (apk, app, bat, cgi, com, exe, gadget, jar, pif, vb, wsf) 
 Game files (dem, gam, nes, rom, sav) 
 CAD files (dwg, dxf) 
 GIS files (gpx, kml, kmz) 
 Web files (asp, aspx, cer, cfm, csr, css, htm, html, js, jsp, php, rss, xhtml) 
 Plugin files (crx, plugin) 
 Font files (fnt, fon, otf, ttf) 
 System files (cab, cpl, cur, deskthemepack, dll, dmp, drv, icns, ico, lnk, 
sys) 
 Settings files (cfg, ini, prf) 
 Encoded files (hqx, mim, uue) 
 Compressed files (7z, cbr, deb, gz, pkg, rar, rpm, sitx, tar.gz, zip, zipx) 
 Disk image files (bin, cue, dmg, iso, mdf, toast, vcd) 
 Developer files (c, class, cpp, cs, dtd, fla, h, java, lua, m, pl, py, sh, sln 
 , vcxproj, xcodeproj) 
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 Backup files (bak, tmp) 
 Miscellaneous files (crdownload, ics, msi, part, torrent) 
Each extension was used as a search term against both sets of smartphones. All 
files that matched the keywords were checked for user data. The numbers include both 
user data and system data (Table 12 & 13). 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 
Text Files 54/55 54/55 8/252 20/53 12/148 8/40 8/11 15/50 
Data Files 406/406 403/406 73/355 115/91 73/1501 73/107 73/73 73/147 
Audio Files 2007/2007 2007/2007 20/2673 20/63 20/1298 20/1162 20/20 20/1190 
Video Files 0/0 0/0 0/9 0/0 0/9 0/95 0/0 0/9 
3D Image Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Raster Image 
Files 
71/71 71/71 3/54 2/4 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/4 
Vector Image 
Files 
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Page Layout Files 18/18 18/18 7/28 14/14 7/7 7/26 7/7 7/13 
Spreadsheet Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/1 0/0 0/0 
Database Files 79/80 80/87 15/52 60/60 15/47 14/51 15/16 15/58 
Executable Files 3/3 3/3 2/10 2/6 2/5 2/4 2/2 2/6 
Game Files 2/2 2/2 2/5 2/2 2/4 2/2 2/2 2/2 
CAD Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
GIS Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Web Files 211/211 212/212 13/13 14/14 12/13 12/12 12/12 12/12 
Plugin Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Font Files 66/66 66/66 56/56 47/47 56/56 56/56 56/56 56/56 
System Files 5/5 6/6 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 
Settings Files 0/0 0/0 0/2 0/0 0/4 0/38 0/0 0/1 
Encoded Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Compressed Files 2/2 2/2 7/7 0/1 0/5 0/1 0/1 0/1 
Disk Image Files 87/87 87/87 8/339 14/14 8/119 8/35 8/8 8/59 
Developer Files 18/18 19/19 1/10 1/9 1/17 1/1 1/7 1/11 
Backup Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Misc Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 




Table 13.   Search result (post-wipe/pre-wipe) part 2 
 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 I18 A20 A21 A25 
Text Files 1/1 14/14 1/1 141/142 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 54/55 0/0 0/0 66/552 
Data Files 0 50/50 0/0 66/66 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 406/406 0/0 0/0 374/2479 
Audio Files 0/0 1/1 1/1 68/68 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 2007/2007 0/0 0/0 1/1 
Video Files 0/0 5/5 0/0 6/6 10/10 5/5 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
3D Image Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Raster Image Files 5/5 716/716 11/11 1938/1938 42/42 15/15 5/5 616/616 71/71 0/7 0/3 70/88 
Vector Image Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Page Layout Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 39/39 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 18/18 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Spreadsheet Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Database Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 80/87 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Executable Files 0/0 95/95 0/0 7/7 3/3 1/1 0/0 0/0 3/3 0/0 0/0 75/77 
Game Files 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 
CAD Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
GIS Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 69/69 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Web Files 0/0 4/4 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 212/212 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Plugin Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Font Files 0/0 39/39 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 66/66 0/0 0/0 0/0 
System Files 0/0 3/3 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 6/6 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Settings Files 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Encoded Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Compressed Files 0/0 22/22 0/0 20/20 6/6 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 3/3 
Disk Image Files 0/0 15/15 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 87/87 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Developer Files 0/0 10/15 0/0 22/22 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 19/19 0/0 0/0 12/12 
Backup Files 0/0 13/13 0/0 24/25 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 177/1018 
Misc Files 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
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No files with the keyword “DELETED” were found in any of the iPhones, only 
on the Android smartphones. Most of the tagged files were text files, but some were zip 
archives, Adobe PDF, MP4 video, and Microsoft Office files. All files containing the 
keyword “DELETED” were unreadable and did not include any user data.  
User-generated Word and Excel files were found as email attachments on the pre-
wipe iPhones (I4, I5, I8) but these files were properly deleted post-wipe. A significant 
amount of user-generated files were recovered from two of the post-wipe Android 
smartphones (A10, A12). Both included Adobe PDF files, Microsoft Word files, 
Microsoft Excel files, MP4 Video files and zip archives. All of these files were user-
generated and contained sensitive information (user name, phone number, email address, 
and personal-video footage). Some of these personal files were located at the top-level 
directory just like the tagged files. However, most of them were found in the directory 
‘\data\com.dropbox.android\file\scratch’. The A10 Android phone contained several 
documents under this directory. Dropbox is third-party software that is installed by the 
user and is used as a file hosting service for various platforms. The software client creates 
a local folder that can be synchronized across multiple platforms. Files that are placed in 
the folder are synced over the network through Dropbox servers [49]. None of the user 
data appears to have been deleted from the Dropbox folder. The same number of files 
was found in this directory pre-wipe. 
G. DISCUSSION 
The reset did a good job of removing user-account and Wi-Fi information 
associated with the phones. However, it did not fully remove photo images, audio files, 
text files, website login information, and geolocation data. 
The UME-36 Pro and Physical Analyzer was able to collect a large variety of data 
after the factory reset. The tool was able to recover several files containing user data or 
user generated text files. There were 20 files recovered from the iPhones and 2483 files 
recovered from the Android phones. These are the total number of files that Cellebrite 
was able to identify. Text and audio files were recovered from several iPhones. Other 
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kinds of user data were left behind on some of the Android phones, including audio, text, 
and picture files.  Many remaining pictures were still viewable, and some remaining 
audio files could still be played back.  
The string search using the grep command found one xml file on an Android 
phone. The xml file contained user login and password information. The Cellebrite tools 
did not identify this xml file. No additional files were found from the iPhone set using 
this method. 
 The Bulk Extractor helped uncover several text files that were not identified by 
Cellebrite or the string search. An additional 157 user files were recovered from the 
Android phones. Some files were left behind by third-party applications such as Dropbox. 
The reset removed the applications but some user data was left behind in the installed 
directory. These files were Microsoft Office files (Word, Excel), Adobe PDF’s and MP4 
video files. Bulk Extractor did a better job of finding email addresses, fax numbers and 
phone numbers within files. However, the additional information was almost always 
found in manuals, acknowledgements, service agreements, and support information for 
system software. It was not personal user information but developer contacts (@tech, 
@helpdesk) and tech support (1-800 numbers). Several text files could be viewed with a 
standard text viewer. Some files contained IP addresses and domain names. Geolocation 
data was found along with timestamps, enabling a view of the locations the phone has 
been used. No additional files were discovered on the iPhones.  
Cellebrite identified that 59% of the files were removed from iPhones and 47% of 
the files were removed from Android phones after a reset. The percentage is calculated 
from the total number of files pre-wipe and post-wipe. It is based off of the total number 
of files identified and listed by the forensics tools. All files identified by both tools were 
manually analyzed and counted.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this thesis was to analyze residual user data on smartphones 
after a factory reset. A total of 21 smartphones were used to test the effectiveness of the 
reset. The experiment was successful in extracting residual user data from the 
smartphones. The data showed that factory resets do not remove all user information. A 
factory reset is not a complete wipe of the device. It appears to only remove files that the 
operating system deems as user generated. If this is the case the reset feature does not 
properly categorize user information. Anybody who has access to commercial forensics 
tools could collect user data from smartphones. This can be a major problem for some 
organizations. The military and the active duty members use smartphones on a daily basis 
and deal with sensitive information. This can become a serious security issue and needs 
to be addressed. There are also many challenges for digital forensics investigations. There 
is a large variability in the number and types of files that are recoverable from 
smartphones. An investigator may not be able to find the specific file or evidence needed 
for the case even when much personal information remains. A large data set can be 
recovered from a phone, but these data files might be files that already existed on the 
device. At the same time, not finding files does not mean evidence is not present on the 
device. The files could be unrecoverable by a single forensic tool and a single experiment 
may not be enough to recover all the evidence.  Multiple experiments and forensics tools 
should be used to distinguish a wide range of files and evidence.  
B. RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES 
We conclude that a “factory reset” as currently implemented is insufficient for 
removing personal data on today’s smartphones. The user wanting to remove all such 
data should take the following steps. 
Delete cache files, browser history files, and browser cookies. Usually this can be 
done through the smartphone settings menu. 
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Manually uninstall all third-party software and review its directories for residual 
user data since a “factory reset” does not generally affect it. Be especially careful with 
off-site backup software such as Dropbox which often store a considerable amount of 
personal data of a user.  
Perform a “factory reset” for the smartphone. 
Check possible locations of remaining copies of personal files, and delete any 
such files that are found, since generally a user file that has been manually copied or 
moved to a top-level or user-created directory will not be erased during a reset. 
Search for remaining personal user files by their common extensions (such as 
“doc”, “txt”, and “mp3”) and delete them. A file explorer application can be used to find 
these files.   
Overwrite deleted data and possibly unused drive storage with specialized 
software. Zeroing out will overwrite free space where deleted files are stored. This will 
prevent deleted files from being recovered. 
In addition, the criticality of these steps can be reduced if the smartphone is 
password-protected and uses OS-level encryption on files.  Encryption will eliminate the 
sensitivity of the data to which it is applied, and passwords will make it harder to access 
data of other users. The Apple iPhone and Google Android phone provide both of these 
with their smartphones. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Possible additional work can be done:  
 A larger and more diverse set of smartphones (including Blackberry, 
Windows Phone, Firefox OS, and Ubuntu Edge) could help provide a 
better overview of the strength and weaknesses of a factory reset. The new 
Cellebrite UFED Touch hardware supports a larger range of smartphones 
and is compatible with MTP. 
 Several forensics tools were tested but not used for this project. Testing 
other tools against Cellebrite and creating a cross reference between 
different tools may produce more reliable data.   
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 This thesis did not explore password protection or encrypted data types. 
Additional research can be conducted on the effectiveness of various 
encryption types. These data types may require additional tools or special 
techniques to decipher. It can create a unique challenge for forensics 
research. 
 Other security techniques can be tested for user-data protections. Several 
software programs (iErase [50], SHREDroid [51]) claim to completely 
erase the internal flash memory of a smartphone. The effectiveness of 
these can be tested and compared against the finding from this paper.  
 A targeted analysis can be done on third-party software solutions. Backup 
software solutions can be further investigated. The research should focus 
on residual data left by third-party software after a factory reset.  
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